The following projects have been realized or are issued from projects made during my university curriculum :
Pricer (C#)
SAS
Auction Theory
Hexadecimal conversion
Pricer
The following project is the PHP version of a C# project I made during my last year at university. During this project two classes have been made in object-oriented programming. The Option class is designed to create a put or call object. The second one allow to price the option based on the Black & Scholes formula.
The values of the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1 are computed under excel with function NORM and realised for 12000 values (from -6 to 6 with a 0.0001 pace). The values are registered in an SQL table and loaded when needed for the calculus.
SAS
The project aims to realize a SASmacro wich will evaluate the modelisation of a financial serie into an autoregressive model AR(1). In order to do that, the macro will calcualte the descriptive statistics and decide if the serie is serially correlated. It then estimate the model as an AR(1) and test the statistical significance of the estimated model.
We will study the ambiguity resulting from the incertitude about the number of bidders in the first price auction (FPA) and the second price auction (SPA). We will distinguish the point of view of bidders and sellers to study their respective preferences between a revealing policy and a concealing policy about the number of bidders. In order to do that we will first make a short reminder of the study's framework as the important hypotesis we will need. We will then study the equilibrium conditions of the strategic function linking the value that the bidder is making about the good of the auction and the bid that he is going to realize. Once those resulsts will be proved, we will compare the differents findings obtained based on the bidding side (bidder or seller) and the fact of being in FPA or in SPA. We will then be able to answer the questions exposed in the introduction of the document "Project" :
How does uncertainty about the number of actual bidders in the auction aﬀect bidding behavior and bidders’ ranking of the the ﬁrst price auction (FPA) vs. the second price auction (SPA)?
Should a seller who knows the actual number of active bidders, reveal or conceal such information to the bidders?
How does uncertainty change the (expected) revenue ranking of the FPA and the SPA away from the Vickrey equivalence result?